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respond to GPDs. The present research sought to examine how teams responded
to negative GPDs. We predicted that failing to reach higher goals would be
perceived as less negative than failing to reach lower goals, and we examined
the moderating influence of setting higher versus lower goals on how teams
responded to performance that fell short of those goals. We also examined the
role that efficacy beliefs that were formed early in those teams played in further
explaining these effects. Results from 94 teams who all failed to reach self-set
goals revealed that teams that failed to reach higher goals downwardly revised
their goals less than teams that failed to reach lower goals. Early efficacy beliefs
further explained these effects. High efficacy beliefs lessened the negative effects
of failing to reach lower goals on subsequent goals. High efficacy beliefs also
lessened the negative effects of failing to reach higher goals while low efficacy
beliefs strengthened the negative effects of failing to reach higher goals. The
implications of these findings for theory, research, and practice are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the many trends in contemporary business, perhaps no other has been as
well documented as the increased use of teams in organisations (e.g. Cohen &
Bailey, 1997; Ilgen, 1999; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). One reason why organi-
sations have increasingly relied on teams to reach specific performance out-
comes is the belief that teams can be more creative, responsive, productive,
efficient, and effective than individuals working alone. Although few man-
agers question the potential benefits of work teams, the fact remains that
teams often fail (Smolek, Hoffman, & Moran, 1999; Sundstrom, 1999). Inter-
estingly, the specific issue of team performance failure and how teams manage
failure has not been the subject of much empirical research (Naquin & Tynan,
2003, is a noteworthy exception).
A number of theoretical models such as control theory (Campion &
Lord, 1982), feedback intervention theory (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), goal-
setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990), and social cognitive theory
(Bandura, 1986) offer insights that might be particularly useful in under-
standing how teams manage performance failures. Each suggests that goals
serve as a frame of reference in which to interpret task performance and
that the discrepancy between goals and performance has some effect on
subsequent goals, subsequent task performance, or both. One goal of the
current study was to examine the intersection of goals and performance in
teams when their performance falls short of the goals they set. In doing so,
we seek to add to both the goal–performance discrepancies (GPDs) and
teams literatures.
We examine the effects of GPDs on two important team outcomes: sub-
sequent team goals and subsequent team performance. Given our specific
interest in teams’ responses to failure, we focus specifically on negative
GPDs. Whereas positive GPDs indicate that a team has exceeded its goal,
negative GPDs indicate that a team has failed to reach its goal. Our explicit
focus on negative GPDs is warranted because although both types of GPDs
can exist in work contexts, it is likely that the effects of negative GPDs1 are
different from those of positive GPDs (Donovan & Williams, 2003). For
example, positive GPDs indicate that there is little or no room for improve-
ment or they might be interpreted as such (Bandura, 1986).
A considerable amount of past research (e.g. Donovan & Williams, 2003;
Williams, Donovan, & Dodge, 2000) has examined GPDs by quantifying the
discrepancy as the numeric difference between goals and performance (i.e.
1 Following the extant literature on goal performance discrepancies (Donovan & Williams,
2003; Williams, Donovan, & Dodge, 2000; Tolli & Schmidt, 2008) and given our specific focus
on negative GPDs only, we refer to negative GPDs as simply GPDs for the remainder of the
article.
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difference scores). For example, Donovan and Williams (2003) explored the
difference between goals and performance on goal revision among varsity
athletes with a specific interest in the effect of the size of the difference on
future goals. Research such as this has greatly increased scholars’ under-
standing of how goals and performance work in tandem suggesting, for
example, that the size of the discrepancy (i.e. whether or not the difference is
large or small) is an important predictor of responses to the discrepancy.
Small GPDs, which indicate that there is not a significant mismatch between
performance and the standard, have been found to be associated with
increases in subsequent goals or low levels of downward goal revision (e.g.
Campion & Lord, 1982; Donovan & Williams, 2003). On the contrary, large
GPDs, which indicate that there is a significant mismatch between perfor-
mance and the standard, are clear and unambiguous indicators of failure and
have been found to be associated with high levels of downward goal revision.
However, such work is not without its critics and some limitations. In par-
ticular, difference scores have been criticised because of their conceptual
ambiguity, tendency to discard relevant information, insensitivity to the
sources of the differences (in the case of GPDs whether the difference is
driven primarily by goals, performance, or both), and overly restrictive con-
straints (see Edwards, 1993, for a comprehensive discussion of the concerns
with difference scores). Similar to recent others who have used alternative
theoretical and/or statistical approaches to avoid the use of difference scores
(e.g. Tolli & Schmidt, 2008), we also avoided the use of difference scores in
this study. Rather than utilise difference scores, which theoretically would
imply that goals are the standard by which performance is compared, we
explored to what extent the strength of prior performance on subsequent
goals and subsequent performance is modified by, or varies across, prior goal
levels (Edwards & Cooper, 1990). That is, we develop predictions regarding
how prior goals moderate the effects of prior performance.
In addition to examining the interactive effects of prior performance and
prior goals, we also examined the role that early collective efficacy beliefs
play in further explaining how teams respond to the joint effects of prior
performance and prior goals. In this way, the current study complements
recent work that is just beginning to directly explore the role of self-efficacy
in explaining reactions to GPDs at the individual level (e.g. Donovan &
Hafsteinsson, 2006; Tolli & Schmidt, 2008). Collective efficacy beliefs are a
team’s collective perception that it can perform successfully (Lindsley, Brass,
& Thomas, 1995). These beliefs help explain what individuals choose to do as
a team, how much effort they put forth, and their staying power when
collective efforts are unsuccessful (Bandura, 1997; Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg,
2009). An extension of the literature on self-efficacy suggests that collective
efficacy beliefs should play an important role in explaining how teams
respond to failure both in terms of their subsequent goals and their
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subsequent performance, but to our knowledge no published empirical
research has directly examined these effects.
Finally, Gully, Incalcaterra, Joshi, and Beaubien (2002) noted that most
previous research on collective efficacy has assumed its causal effects or failed
to specify the direction of its relationship with team processes and outcomes.
As such, there remains a need to explore how early motivational beliefs and
attitudes in teams influence reactions to performance that falls short of team
goals. In this study, we examined the effects of early efficacy beliefs (i.e. those
developed before there were significant opportunities to work on the team
task, but after the team had been together long enough to draw meaningful
conclusions about their task ability).
Prior Performance, Prior Goals, and their
Interactive Effects
There is little question as to whether prior performance relates to future
performance in teams. Riggs and Knight (1994) suggested that this notion
underlies the cliché “success breeds success” (see also Lindsley et al., 1995).
Prior performance provides salient information for group members and has
long been thought to have an impact on team members’ perceptions and
behaviors (e.g. Barr & Conlon, 1994; Nadler, 1979). Matsui, Kakuyama, and
Onglatco (1987), for instance, found a strong correlation (i.e. r = .87) between
pre- and post-feedback performance in teams. We therefore predict that prior
performance will be positively associated with subsequent team goals and
performance. However, in the current study, all of the teams failed to reach
their goals. We therefore predict that in response to the failure experience, the
worse our teams perform, the more they will reduce their subsequent goals.
We predict a similar pattern of effects for subsequent team performance for
several reasons. First, team goals are often correlated with team performance
(O’Leary-Kelly, Martocchio, & Frink, 1994). Second, because team goals
affect effort and persistence (Weldon, Jehn, & Pradham, 1991), lower subse-
quent goals are likely to be associated with lower subsequent performance.
This does not suggest that our teams will lower their goals and lower their
performance. Rather, it suggests that our teams will generally lower their
goals in response to their failure and although they might experience perfor-
mance improvements relative to their initial performance, their subsequent
performance is likely to be highly correlated with the subsequent goals they
set. Moreover, teams that set lower goals should experience less performance
improvement than teams that set higher goals. Therefore, we expect that to
the extent to which teams revise their goals downward when they fail, their
subsequent performance improvements will suffer. Although our first
hypothesis is relatively straightforward, it provides a necessary first step in
developing the remainder of our hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 1: Prior performance will be related to (a) subsequent goals and (b)
subsequent performance such that lower time 1 performance will be associated
with lower time 2 goals and time 2 performance.
Previous research suggests that prior goals (i.e. goal level) can help better
explain the effects of prior performance (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002).
Among their many purposes, goals serve as a frame of reference in which to
interpret task performance. A number of theoretical models suggest that
individuals compare their performance to a standard (i.e. goal). These
models also suggest that because individuals are sensitive to, and bothered
by, discrepancies between their performance and goals, performance that
falls short of goals leads to dissatisfaction (e.g. Austin & Vancouver, 1996;
Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Previous research suggests that individuals respond
to such discrepancies by engaging in behavior designed to reduce the discrep-
ancy (e.g. Donovan & Williams, 2003; Williams et al., 2000).
In terms of how individuals respond to GPDs, previous research suggests
that respones largely depend on the size (or magnitude) of the GPD
(Donovan & Williams, 2003; Phillips, Hollenbeck, & Ilgen, 1996; Williams
et al., 2000). Previous research has demonstrated that larger GPDs are asso-
ciated with greater amounts of downward goal revision in an attempt to
make the goals easier to reach (Donovan & Williams, 2003). In fact,
Campion and Lord (1982) suggested that the more severe the failure, the
more subsequent goals will be reduced. In terms of subsequent performance,
one might expect that individuals would respond to large GPDs by increasing
their performance because large GPDs indicate room for improvement.
However, large GPDs often have de-motivating effects because of the extent
to which they suggest that performance is far from one’s goals. Donovan and
Williams (2003) suggested that large GPDs can lead individuals to conclude
that there is little point in expending the effort necessary to reach the goals,
especially when they believe that the reason for the discrepancy is not under
their control. Ilies and Judge (2005) found evidence supporting their predic-
tion that the magnitude of downward goal revision was proportional to the
magnitude of the negative feedback. All of this suggests that, in general, when
individuals fail, a likely response is some reduction of goals and some per-
formance improvements, but as the magnitude of the discrepancy increases,
the more goals will be reduced, which in turn may be associated with increas-
ingly smaller performance improvements.
Closely related is work that has directly explored the interactive effects of
goals and performance, in which researchers have shown that goals serve as
a frame of reference for individuals when interpreting and making choices
about how to react to their performance. This research has shown that
information about past performance is most influential in the presence of
goals and vice versa (e.g. Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor,
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1979; Locke & Latham, 1990; O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1994; Taylor, Fisher, &
Ilgen, 1984; Zander, 1971). Locke and Latham (2002) explained this interac-
tion by stating that for goals to be effective, people need information about
their performance to understand how they are doing relative to those goals.
In this study, we examine to what extent taking into account prior goals
can help explain the effects of prior performance in teams on their reactions
to failure. Because so little attention has been devoted to examining these
effects at the team level, we relied on previous theory and research on the
joint effects of goals and performance at the individual level. As such, we
assumed a high degree of functional equivalence across levels of analysis,
although we expected that these influences would be manifested via different
processes (see Chen & Kanfer, 2006; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999).
We predict that the negative effects of failing might be better explained by
also taking into account whether teams failed to reach relatively higher or
lower goals. Failing to reach lower goals should be considered more negative
than failing to reach higher goals because lower goals are more conservative
than higher goals. Lower goals should be more easily obtained than higher
goals. Failing to reach lower, more conservative goals therefore speaks more
negatively about a team’s performance. Prior research suggests that failing to
reach lower goals is likely to evoke a more negative reaction than failing to
reach higher goals. DeShon and Alexander (1996), for instance, found that
responses to feedback that was considered too negative led to less persistence
and fewer searches for better task strategies. Similarly, research demonstrat-
ing that the effects of larger GPDs are more negative than those for smaller
GPDs (e.g. Campion & Lord, 1982; Donovan & Williams, 2003; Williams
et al., 2000) also supports our prediction. Like large GPDs, an inability to
reach lower goals suggests a greater degree of failure than does an inability to
reach higher goals, which like small GPDs, may suggest that there is little
room for improvement. It follows that we predict that among teams that fail,
the teams that would respond the most negatively (i.e. have the most down-
ward goal revision and the worse subsequent performance) would be those
that previously set the lowest goals (i.e. those who failed to a greater extent).
Hypothesis 2: The effects of prior performance on (a) subsequent goals and (b)
subsequent performance will be further explained by prior goals such that the
effects of time 1 performance will be stronger for teams that set lower goals than
for teams that set higher goals.
Early Collective Efficacy Beliefs as a Moderator of the
Prior Performance ¥ Prior Goal Interaction
Collective efficacy beliefs are a team’s collective expectations for success on a
task (Bandura, 1986). They are positively related to both expected and actual
performance in teams (Gully et al., 2002; Stajkovic et al., 2009). Explana-
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tions for these effects include the influence of collective efficacy beliefs on
what individuals choose to do as a team, how much effort they put forth, and
their staying power when collective efforts are unsuccessful (Bandura, 1997;
Stajkovic et al., 2009). Although efficacy beliefs can form over time as
members develop confidence in their collective ability to effectively accom-
plish team goals based on their past experiences (Lindsley et al., 1995), they
may also be the result of general feelings, or affect, among the members of the
team (Gibson, 2003). Levine and Moreland (1990) suggested that behaviors,
attitudes, and cognitions that develop during early team formation may have
important influences on what groups and teams later become. This suggests
both the need for explicit focus on motivational factors that are developed at
various stages of teams’ life cycles and the need to employ research designs
that allow researchers to draw conclusions regarding the causal effects of
such motivational factors.
Although we are unaware of any published empirical research that has
explicitly examined the effects of early collective efficacy beliefs on teams’
responses to failure, some recent work has examined the effects of self-
efficacy beliefs on goal revision among individuals. Tolli and Schmidt (2008)
argued that self-efficacy beliefs are positively related to the tendency to
pursue more stringent performance goals. They also suggested that individu-
als with low self-efficacy beliefs are likely to choose goals that will help them
avoid potential hits at their already fragile self-perceptions (see also Bandura,
1997). Citing Bandura (1986), Donovan and Hafsteinsson (2006) noted that
self-efficacy may exert its strongest influence on self-regulation through its
impact on goal revision decisions. Extending this work to the team level, we
expect that early efficacy beliefs may further explain teams’ reactions to
different types of failures.
Turning first to when teams fail to reach higher goals, we predicted that, in
general, failing to reach higher goals would have a less negative effect on
teams than failing to reach lower goals. Although both high and low efficacy
teams can set higher goals, only high efficacy teams should truly have high
performance expectations (Gully et al., 2002). High efficacy teams are also
more likely than low efficacy teams to believe that there is a strong link
between their effort and their performance (Bandura, 1997; Stajkovic et al.,
2009). Taken together, high efficacy teams who set higher performance goals
should believe that they can actually reach those goals and that they can
reach those goals via increased effort. This should not be the case with low
efficacy teams. Although they lack confidence in their capabilities, low effi-
cacy teams who set higher performance goals set those goals because they
are hopeful and at least willing to exert effort towards their task. Despite
their perceptions about their ability, they aspire to perform at high levels, as
evidenced by their goals because goals are representations of desires, or
statements about performance aspirations (Silver & Bufanio, 1996; Zander,
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1971). High aspirations coupled with low collective efficacy beliefs can set
these teams up for disappointment. Whereas high efficacy teams are likely to
interpret failing to reach higher goals as a challenge, low efficacy teams are
likely to interpret it as discouraging. Moreover, given their resiliency, high
efficacy teams are likely to respond to failing to reach higher goals by increas-
ing their efforts, whereas low efficacy teams are likely to conclude that
continued efforts to reach higher goals are fruitless. We therefore expect that
low efficacy teams will be more likely to abandon those higher goals than
high efficacy teams. It is worth noting that our expectations are consistent
with research that suggests that low efficacy teams that fail to reach higher
goals will find this experience particularly disheartening (Silver & Bufanio,
1996).
Although we predict that low efficacy beliefs will be disadvantageous (i.e.
lead to more downward goal revision, and by extension, lower levels of
subsequent performance) and high efficacy beliefs will be advantageous (i.e.
lead to less downward goal revision and by extension, higher levels of sub-
sequent performance) when teams fail to reach higher goals, we expect the
opposite when teams fail to reach lower goals. Failing to reach lower goals
should be a particularly negative experience for teams because regardless of
a team’s actual ability, lower goals are more easily obtainable than higher
goals. Compared to high efficacy teams who set lower goals, low efficacy
teams who set lower goals have little confidence in their ability, low expec-
tations about their performance, and little desire to perform at high levels
(Gully et al., 2002). At the individual level, Gist (1987) suggested that one of
the pitfalls of having efficacy beliefs that are too high may be overconfidence,
suggesting that low efficacy teams might be more likely than high efficacy
teams to anticipate failures. As a result, low efficacy teams who have the
foresight to set lower performance goals should be less disappointed with
news that they failed to reach lower goals than high efficacy teams who
should anticipate meeting those goals. Thus, we expect a more negative
reaction from high efficacy teams who fail to reach lower goals than we do
low efficacy teams who fail to reach lower goals.
We should also note that the pattern we are predicting is also consistent
with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dissonance
theory suggests that it is especially difficult for individuals to reconcile incom-
patible information (e.g. cognitions). Extending this to the team level, when
a high efficacy team receives especially negative performance information,
such as would be the case following failure to reach lower goals, it may create
a state of dissonance because the team’s efficacy beliefs are so different from
its performance. This state of dissonance is likely to lead to discomfort and
attempts to avoid information likely to increase the dissonance. We therefore
would expect that the dissonance experienced by such teams could serve as a
distraction that might divert attention that could be better utilised working
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on the task itself. High efficacy teams experiencing such dissonance may be at
an increased risk of simply rejecting such negative feedback, thus failing to
learn from it, which may in turn hinder subsequent performance improve-
ments (Nease, Mudgett, & Quinones, 1999). In contrast, for low efficacy
teams who experience failures of this magnitude, there would no dissonance
as the experience only confirms what members already thought about their
team’s ability. Failing to reach even low goals should not come as a surprise,
nor should it be particularly disappointing.
Hypothesis 3: The interactive effects of prior performance and prior goals (i.e.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b) on (a) subsequent goals and (b) subsequent performance
will be further explained by early efficacy beliefs. Specifically, among teams that
fail to reach higher goals, high efficacy beliefs will lessen the effects of prior
performance, while low efficacy beliefs will strengthen the effects of prior perfor-
mance. However, among teams that fail to reach lower goals, high efficacy beliefs
will strengthen the effects of prior performance, while low efficacy beliefs will
lessen the effects of prior performance.
Again, we explicitly acknowledge that our predictions as they relate to
subsequent goals and subsequent performance are identical. As previously
noted, goals and performance are positively related (e.g. O’Leary-Kelly et al.,
1994) and there is reason to expect that lower goals result in lower perfor-
mance (Weldon et al., 1991). Nevertheless, it is important to treat and
examine subsequent goals and subsequent performance as separate outcomes
for several reasons. First, although positively related, the two are conceptu-
ally distinct and uniquely important (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1994; Weldon &
Weingart, 1993). Second, and perhaps more importantly, is that previous
research on goal revision suggests that individuals often respond to GPDs by
changing their performance and/or changing their goals (Donovan & Will-
iams, 2003; Williams et al., 2000). There is reason to expect the same in team
settings. For example, DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, and Wiech-
mann (2004) argued that individuals can change their goals in addition to, or
instead of, changing their actual behavior in response to feedback in teams.
Third, some previous research on reactions to GPDs suggests that individu-
als are more likely to downwardly revise their goals when faced with a failure
experience than change their performance, especially when downward goal
revision is easier to accomplish (Donovan & Williams, 2003). In general, the
larger the GPD and the greater the extent of the failure, the more time and
effort will be perceived as needed to address the discrepancy and failure
(Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). In team settings, where team performance is a
function of interdependent individuals and is based on their collective per-
formances (Sundstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, 1990), it might, in fact, be easier
to downwardly revise goals than to improve performance. By distinguishing
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between, and separately examining, these two outcomes in the current study,
we are able to explore this possibility.
METHOD
Sample, Research Task, and Procedures
Participants were 384 male and female undergraduate students who were
enrolled in a management course at a university located in the southern
United States. Participation was voluntary; however, participants received
extra course credit in addition to the opportunity to win a $100 cash prize
based on their team’s performance on the task. All participants worked on a
modified version of the Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD) Simu-
lation developed for the Department of Defense for research and training
purposes (see Hollenbeck, Moon, Ellis, West, Ilgen, Sheppard, Porter, &
Wagner, 2002, for a complete description of the task). In this version of the
simulation, team members, who are seated in a common room to facilitate
verbal communication, work on networked computers to protect an
on-screen geographic airspace by destroying enemy targets that enter
restricted areas while at the same time they are to avoid destroying friendly
targets. To protect the restricted areas, teams are given a total of 16
resources, or sub-platforms, that are distributed such that each team member
has four resources of his or her own. In this particular study, the teams were
structured functionally such that each team member (labeled Decision
Maker, or DM) was responsible for one of four types of military sub-
platform—tanks, helicopters, jets, and reconnaissance planes—all of which
have varying capabilities to identify and destroy targets. Specifically, DM1
operated all of the team’s reconnaissance planes, DM2 operated all of the
team’s tanks, DM3 operated all of the team’s helicopters, and DM4 operated
all of the team’s jets. To defend the geographic airspace, team members had
to discuss the location of the targets on the screen (no one team member
could see all of the screen and all of the targets), make decisions regarding
which tracks to shoot down or ignore, and coordinate their resources (dif-
ferent targets required different types of resources to destroy them). To the
extent that the teams made accurate decisions regarding whether or not
to eliminate potentially threatening targets and executed those decisions
quickly, they received higher scores on the task. Given the functional struc-
ture of the teams, the demands presented by the targets, and the fact that the
reward (i.e. cash prize) was based on the performance of the team as a whole,
our task involved high levels of task and outcome interdependence.
Upon entering the laboratory, all participants were randomly assigned
both to a four-person work team and to one of four computer stations.
Our entire sample was composed of 96 teams. Participants first received
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declarative and procedural training, which lasted for approximately 1 hr.
Approximately 40 min. of the training was devoted to hands-on training. At
the end of the training, teams were allowed to practice on the team task for
10 min. with limited direct assistance from the team’s experimenter.
Although very similar to the actual task the team would perform, the practice
task presented the teams with fewer enemy targets given its shorter duration
and the pattern in which the targets were presented was slightly less complex.
At the onset of the practice, each team began the task with 50,000 defensive
points. Consistent with the defensive nature of the task, teams were
instructed to keep their defensive points as close to the 50,000-point mark as
possible. Teams lost 1 point for each second that any enemy target was in a
restricted zone and 2 points for each second that any enemy target was in a
highly restricted zone. By allowing our teams to practice on their own for
10 min. after the training, we ensured that the performance score that they
received at the end of practice would be relatively high compared to the score
they would likely receive after working on the task for the full 30 min.
Immediately after the practice opportunity, team members received and
completed the collective efficacy measure. Thus, responses to the collective
efficacy measure were based on approximately 1 hr. and 10 min. of time
together in which members interacted with each other and were able to
observe each other’s performances in addition to each other’s interactions
with the experimenter. During this time, members also had numerous oppor-
tunities to discuss the task and their individual and collective performances.
After completing the collective efficacy measure, each team member received
a goal form and teams were told that they would need to agree to a team goal
for the first task (i.e. time 1 goal) and write it down on their goal forms. The
experimenter then presented the team with the range of possible scores (from
-8,400 to +50,000 points) before giving members several minutes to decide on
their performance goal for the first task. It would have been virtually impos-
sible for a team to obtain a defensive score as high as +50,000 points and
highly unlikely for a team to obtain a score as low as -8,400 points; however,
we purposely provided the actual range of scores based on the best and worst
possible performances to allow for some natural variance in the goals that
teams set for themselves. Moreover, by providing this range of possible
scores when teams set the goals for the first of the two performance trials, it
allowed us to provide teams with the same possible range of scores at time 2
and thus we could be consistent throughout the experiment. Additionally,
the experimenter informed the teams that their performance on the 10 min.
practice task could be used to deduce how they might perform on the upcom-
ing 30 min. task.
Teams then worked on the first of the two 30 min. performance tasks. At
the end of the first task, teams were provided with a score for their perfor-
mance (i.e. time 1 performance). Teams were then instructed to spend several
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minutes deciding on a team goal for the second task (i.e. time 2 goal). Again,
team members were instructed to write down the team goal that was collec-
tively agreed upon. The team then worked on the second task. Following the
second task, teams received their score (i.e. time 2 performance). At the end
of the experiment, all team members were debriefed and dismissed. The entire
experiment lasted for approximately 3 hr.
Measures
Early Efficacy Beliefs. Collective efficacy beliefs were measured with a
seven-item scale adapted from Riggs and Knight’s (1994) collective efficacy
measure (e.g. “The members of this team have excellent task skills” and “This
team is not able to perform as well as it should”). Responses to the items for
this measure were based on a 5-point Likert-scale and any reversed-coded
items were reverse-scored. Previous research suggests that such measures
are sufficiently similar to more traditional approaches to measuring efficacy
beliefs and lead to similar results (Maurer & Pierce, 1998). The measure was
based on a referent-shift composition model (Chan, 1998) that assumes that
there is some true score for each team and that within-team variability
represents rater error. Thus, we examined the appropriateness of aggregating
this measure to the team level using procedures common among researchers
interested in justifying aggregation decisions (i.e. rwg(j), which in this case was
estimated based on a uniform distribution, ICC(1), and an F-test to deter-
mine whether or not there was more between- than within-team variance on
our efficacy measure; see DeShon et al., 2004). We found sufficient justifica-
tion for aggregating collective efficacy beliefs to the team level, mean
rwg(j) = .89 with scores ranging from .76 to .99, ICC(1) = .14, F(93, 282) = 1.63,
p < .01.
Time 1 and Time 2 Goals. Team goals were measured by the agreed upon
performance goal that team members decided on prior to each task (i.e. at
time 1 and time 2). Each team member was asked what the decided upon
team goal was for each performance episode. Although measured at the
individual member level, each team had to agree on the team’s goal; therefore
there was no opportunity for within-team variance on time 1 goals or time 2
goals and it represented the performance goal of the team as a whole.2
2 To ensure that our team goal measures were based on consensus rather than some subset of
members who dominated the goal-setting discussion, we privately collected some additional
information about members’ perceptions of the team goals and members’ ideal team goals.
Specifically, we asked each team member, “Regardless of the goal that was agreed upon by your
team, what do you think would have been the most appropriate team defensive goal?” There was
a considerable agreement within teams about what was the most appropriate goal for the team
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Time 1 and Time 2 Performance. Team performance was measured at
time 1 and time 2 by the computer simulation and was based on the team’s
defensive performance consistent with the task mission. High defensive per-
formance scores at the end of the 30 min. task were indicative of higher levels
of performance. Given both the nature of the team’s task and the functional
nature of the team’s structure, team performance represented not only the
individual performances of team members, but also the extent to which they
were able to successfully coordinate their individual efforts.
Analyses
Given our focus on team failure, we dropped two teams that met their time
1 goal. The fact that only two of the 96 teams in our sample met their goal at
time 1 provided direct, objective evidence that the goals teams set at time 1
were challenging. As we noted earlier, we developed our hypotheses in such
a way as to avoid evoking difference scores and our analytical approach
avoided the use of difference scores as well. We tested all of our hypotheses
with two sets of hierarchical moderated regressions—one for subsequent
goals and one for subsequent performance. Specifically, we tested Hypoth-
eses 1a and 1b by regressing subsequent goals and subsequent performance
on prior performance. We then tested Hypotheses 2a and 2b by examining
the two-way interaction between prior performance and prior goals on sub-
sequent goals and subsequent performance. Finally, we tested Hypotheses 3a
and 3b by examining the three-way interaction between prior performance,
prior goals, and early efficacy beliefs. We plotted our interaction effects
following the recommendations of Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003)
and using regression slopes for low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of our
predictors around their means. In the case of our three-way interactions, we
also conducted tests of the simple slopes based on recommendations by
Aiken and West (1991).
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations
among our study’s variables. To provide a more complete examination of our
and more between-team variance than within-team variance at both time 1, ICC(1) = .56, F(93,
275) = 6.14, p < .01, and time 2, ICC(1) = .66, F(93, 278) = 8.80, p < .01. In addition, we compared
each team member’s response to this question for each goal (i.e. time 1 and time 2) to their
individual response to the question regarding the decided upon team goal using a paired t-test.
Team members’ aggregate perceptions of what was the most appropriate goal were not different
from their agreed upon team goal at time 1, t(93) = -.12, p > .05, or time 2, t(93) = 1.35, p > .05.
Therefore, within teams, members collectively decided on their team’s goal and the goal measure
we used was indeed representative of the teams’ rather than any subset of members’ decision.
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data along with an opportunity to explore the relationships between the
difference between goals and performance across our two time periods with
our other variables of interest we also created two difference scores. The first
represented the difference between time 1 goals and time 1 performance and
therefore captured the GPD created at time 1 as a result of our encouraging
our teams to set challenging goals in conjunction with our teams’ time 1
performances. The second represented the difference between time 2 goals
and time 2 performance and therefore captured the GPD created at time 2 as
a result of the difference between the subsequent goals our teams set follow-
ing their first performance episode and their efforts towards meeting those
goals. These variables are directly comparable to those used in previous
research on GPDs (e.g. Donovan & Hafsteinsson, 2006; Williams et al.,
2000) and reveal a number of interesting and relevant findings, in particular
the GPD variable created from the data collected at time 1.
For instance, and as can be seen in the table, although teams set goals that
they were unable to reach at time 1, there was considerable variance in the
magnitude of the discrepancies between time 1 goals and time 1 performance.
In addition, following the initial failure to reach time 1 goals, teams generally
responded by both lowering their goals and by improving their performance.
As can also be seen in the table, on average, teams created a positive GPD
(where performance > goals yet which is represented by a negative GPD
value, indicating that time 2 performance generally exceeded time 2 goals);
however, there was also considerable variance in the magnitude of this dis-
crepancy. Perhaps more importantly, we were able to examine whether or not
our teams simply set unrealistically high goals at time 1 that they then
lowered at time 2 to make consistent with their time 1 performance. The goals
that teams set at time 1 were generally well within the range of performance
scores because, as can be seen in the table, the range of time 2 performance
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations (N = 94)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Time 2 Performance 36072.03 4379.37
(2) Time 2 Goals 31744.16 4185.72 .47**
(3) Time 1 Performance 28090.26 3957.00 .67** .72**
(4) Time 1 Goals 39228.19 4740.48 .25* .37** .22*
(5) Time 1 Goal–Performance
Discrepancy
11137.92 5478.06 .27** -.20† .54** .71**
(6) Time 2 Goal–Performance
Discrepancy
-4327.87 4411.42 -.58** .48** .02 .10 .07
(7) Early Efficacy Beliefs 3.31 .32 .27** .32** .26* .29** .06 .03
* p < .05; ** p < .01; † p < .10.
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scores overlaps with time 1 goals. Therefore, although the goals that were set
at time 1 were higher than most teams were able to reach during the first
performance opportunity, the goals were indeed realistic. Also, a supplemen-
tal paired t-test demonstrated that time 2 goals were different from time 1
performance, t(93) = 11.50, p < .01, and that despite their failure experience,
teams continued to aim for relatively high goals. This later finding led us to
conclude that these data were appropriate for testing our hypotheses.
Tests of Study Hypotheses
Table 2 presents the tests of our study hypotheses. The left half of the table
presents our hierarchical moderated regression predicting subsequent goals,
and the right half of the table presents our hierarchical moderated regression
predicting subsequent performance. As can be seen in Model 1 on the left half
of the table, we found effects for both time 1 goals and time 1 performance on
subsequent goals, b = .20, p < .01 and b = .65, p < .01, respectively. The latter
effect provides support for Hypothesis 1a. As can be seen in Model 1 on the
right half of the table, only time 1 performance had an effect on subsequent
team performance, b = .63, p < .01, but this nevertheless yielded support for
Hypothesis 1b.
TABLE 2
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses
Variables
Subsequent goals
(Time 2 goals)
Subsequent performance
(Time 2 performance)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Time 1 Goals .20** .18** .19** .09 .11 .13
Time 1 Performance .65** .63** .64** .63** .64** .67**
Early Efficacy Beliefs .09 .18** .24** .08 .07 .14
Time 1 Goals ¥ Time 1
Performance
-16* -.18** .03 .00
Early Efficacy Beliefs ¥ Time
1 Goals
.27** .22** -.02 -.07
Early Efficacy Beliefs ¥ Time
1 Performance
-.17* -.22** .16† .09
Early Efficacy Beliefs ¥ Time 1
Goals ¥ Time 1 Performance
-.17† -.21*
DR2 .57 .07 .01 .46 .03 .02
R2 .57 .64 .65 .46 .49 .51
DF 39.13** 5.45** 3.57† 25.91** 1.40 4.16*
N = 94. Standardised coefficients are presented.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; † p < .10.
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As can be seen in Model 2 on the left half of the table, there was a two-way
interaction between time 1 performance and time 1 goals on subsequent
goals, b = -.16, p < .05. We plotted this interaction in Figure 1. The pattern
of this effect was consistent with the one we predicted in Hypothesis 2a.
Specifically, the teams that responded the most negatively to their failure (i.e.
demonstrated the most downward goal revision) were those that set lower
time 1 goals compared to those that set higher time 1 goals. As can be seen in
Model 2 on the right half of the table, we did not find evidence of a two-way
interaction between time 1 performance and time 1 goals on subsequent
performance, b = .03, ns. Thus, we found no support for Hypothesis 2b.
As can be seen in Model 3 on the left half of the table, we found evidence
of a three-way interaction between time 1 performance, time 1 goals, and
early efficacy beliefs on subsequent goals, b = -.17, p = .06, although this
effect fell just short of the p < .05 criterion for significance testing. We plotted
the three-way interaction in Figure 2. Turning first to when teams failed to
reach higher goals, we found a difference in the simple slopes between high
and low efficacy teams, t(90) = -1.83, p = .07. Consistent with our predictions,
and as can be seen at the top of Figure 2, the effects of failing to reach higher
goals were less negative for high efficacy teams compared to low efficacy
teams. Comparing these effects to those plotted in Figure 1, there was
support for our prediction that high efficacy would mitigate, whereas low
efficacy would exacerbate, the negative effects of failing to reach higher goals.
Turning next to when teams failed to reach lower goals, we again found a
difference in the simple slopes for our high and low efficacy teams, t(90) =
-2.60, p < .01. However, the nature of this interaction was inconsistent with
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FIGURE 1. Two-way interaction between time 1 performance and time 1
goals.
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our predictions. Although we did not predict it, we found that when teams
failed to reach lower goals, high efficacy beliefs mitigated, rather than
exacerbated, those negative effects. Thus, we found mixed support for
Hypothesis 3a.
Finally, and as can be seen in Model 3 on the right half on the table, we also
found evidence of a three-way interaction between time 1 performance, time
1 goals, and early efficacy beliefs on subsequent goals, b = -.21, p < .05. We
plotted this interaction in Figure 3. Turning first to when teams failed to
reach higher goals, our simple slope tests failed to provide evidence of a
difference between high and low efficacy teams, t(90) = .65, ns. Turning next
to when teams failed to reach lower goals, our simple slopes tests again
revealed no difference between the slopes for our high and low efficacy teams,
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FIGURE 2. Three-way interaction between time 1 performance, time 1 goals,
and early efficacy beliefs on subsequent goals.
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t(90) = .93, ns. Taken together, we found no support for Hypothesis 3b;
however, we did find one particularly noteworthy pattern of effects as can be
seen in both the top and bottom of Figure 3. Specifically, we found that even
high efficacy teams demonstrated some of the lowest levels of subsequent
performance at time 2.
DISCUSSION
The goals of the current study were twofold. First, we sought to examine the
joint, interactive effects of prior performance and prior goals on subsequent
goals and subsequent performance when teams failed to reach their goals. As
such, our study is one of the first that explicitly examines team failure.
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FIGURE 3. Three-way interaction between time 1 performance, time 1 goals,
and early efficacy beliefs on subsequent performance.
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Second, we sought to examine the extent to which early efficacy beliefs might
help further explain these effects. In doing so, we demonstrated how ques-
tions about how goals and performance work in tandem could be answered
while at the same time avoiding the methodological ambiguities that often
arise when researchers examine such effects using difference scores.
We found that, in terms of subsequent goals, teams generally had more
negative reactions to failing to reach lower goals than they did to failing to
reach higher goals. This finding was consistent with much of the previous
work on individual reactions to GPDs, in particular when the magnitude
of the GPD is large (Campion & Lord, 1982; Donovan & Williams, 2003;
Williams et al., 2000). We also found that early efficacy beliefs could help
further explain these effects. Although the patterns we found regarding the
moderating effects of early efficacy beliefs only partially supported our
hypotheses, our findings nevertheless complement recent research on the role
of self-efficacy beliefs in how individuals manage GPDs. In our study, when
teams failed to reach higher goals, high early efficacy beliefs mitigated the
negative effects of the failure on subsequent goals while low early efficacy
beliefs exacerbated the negative effects of the failure. Contrary to our pre-
dictions, when teams failed to reach lower goals, high early efficacy beliefs
also mitigated, rather than exacerbated, the negative effects of the failure.
These findings support the notion that high collective efficacy has important
buffering effects when teams face adversity (Gully et al., 2002; Stajkovic
et al., 2009). Our results indicating that high early efficacy beliefs mitigated
the potential negative effects on subsequent goals among teams who failed to
reach higher and lower goals also suggests that the magnitude of the failure
may not be a boundary condition for the benefits of high collective efficacy.
Coupling our failure to find evidence for our hypothesised three-way inter-
action on subsequent performance with the notion that goals are likely to be
a better representation of motivation than performance (Weldon & Wein-
gart, 1993), our findings regarding how teams with high early efficacy beliefs
responded to failures has implications for theory and research that seeks to
explain why high collective efficacy can be detrimental in teams. Tasa and
Whyte (2005) found evidence of a curvilinear relationship between efficacy
and vigilant problem solving such that teams that were low and high on
efficacy devoted the least time to problem solving which in turn negatively
affected their decision-making performance. Although we also found some of
the lowest levels of subsequent performance among teams with high early
efficacy beliefs, our findings regarding the goals these teams set suggests that
complacency would not explain why high collective efficacy beliefs were
associated with low levels of performance in this study. Rather, our findings
are more consistent with the notion that teams with high efficacy beliefs may
reject negative feedback or fail to discontinue the use of ineffective perfor-
mance strategies (Whyte, 1998). Our findings also raise the possibility that
TEAMS, GOAL–PERFORMANCE DISCREPANCIES, COLLECTIVE EFFICACY 663
© 2011 The Authors. Applied Psychology: An International Review © 2011 International
Association of Applied Psychology.
teams with high efficacy beliefs may abandon effective strategies while engag-
ing in searches for even more effective strategies that could also result in
lower levels of performance. Future research should explicitly examine these
potential explanatory mechanisms. This research should also conceptually
and empirically distinguish goals from performance. Had we not done so, we
might have drawn incorrect conclusions regarding the moderating effects of
collective efficacy.
Implications
In addition to highlighting both the advantages and potential disadvantages
of high efficacy beliefs in teams, our findings suggest at least three important
practical implications. First, our findings suggest the potential danger in
setting conservative goals that might be perceived as easily obtainable. In real
teams, this is often done during the early stages of team development or when
a team begins working on a relatively new, or changing, task. In this study,
on average, teams that failed to reach relatively lower goals responded by
reducing their goals more than teams that failed to reach relatively higher
goals. Failing to reach lower, as opposed to higher, goals does appear to be
perceived as a more significant failure and has the potential to be especially
de-motivating.
Second, our results also have implications for the common practice of
setting stretch goals in teams. This is often done with the hope that if teams
at least aim high then even if they fail they may nevertheless reach higher
levels of performance than if they had aimed low. Our results suggest that
the failure experiences that result from unsuccessful attempts to reach espe-
cially high goals can also have strong de-motivating effects, especially for
low efficacy teams. Related to this, our findings also have implications for
self-managed teams in real organisations that, similar to the teams in our
study, are charged with discussing and collectively setting their own
performance goals (Levine & Moreland, 1990; Pearson, 1987). Previous
research suggests that when given the opportunity to self-set their goals
teams are likely to set difficult rather than easy goals (Latham & Lee,
1986). An extension of our findings therefore suggests that the opportunity
to self-set goals perhaps should be reserved for high efficacy teams. We
recommend that such teams be warned of the potential for failure when
setting especially high goals and encouraged to use any failures as learning
experiences.
Finally, because we found effects for early collective efficacy beliefs, we
suggest that organisations devote more attention to shaping team members’
early experiences and interactions with one another. For example,
Kozlowski, Gully, Salas, and Cannon-Bowers (1996) suggested that one
important role that leaders play in the early formation of teams is that of
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mentor in which they can help shape and build members’ affect and attitudes
about the team and the task. We suggest that teams be presented with
opportunities to develop high efficacy beliefs. However, we also recommend
that teams be discouraged from becoming too confident about their ability if
it is likely that the team will later experience failures.
Limitations and Future Research
Despite the insight our study provides, it is not without some limitations that
deserve mention. One such limitation was our participants and the context in
which we conducted our study. Although our use of undergraduate students
working together for a limited amount of time on a team task in a laboratory
setting provided us a high level of control in addition to the opportunity to
induce a failure experience with limited negative consequences, it does limit
our generalisability. Although our findings have implications for teams
working on complex tasks, striving for performance-based rewards, and who
are responsible for setting and monitoring their own progress towards reach-
ing self-set goals (e.g. self-managed and project teams), future research
should explore the effects of prior goals, prior performance, and efficacy
beliefs using real work teams.
Another limitation is that to create failure experiences, we induced all of
our teams to set goals that were somewhat high. Even the teams that set the
lowest goals in this study did not set extremely low goals per se. As a result,
we are unable to generalise our findings to teams that fail to reach very low
goals. Somewhat related, because we provided our teams with a performance
score to reference in setting their performance goals that would result in their
setting a goal that was specific and challenging but also likely unobtainable,
we created a situation in which teams were likely to respond by lowering their
goals (e.g. Donovan & Williams, 2003). Fortunately, our primary interest
was not whether or not our teams would reduce their goals or improve
following their failure experiences, but rather whether or not early efficacy
beliefs might help explain to what the extent our teams would reduce their
goals or improve following those failure experiences.
Finally, we should remind readers that despite our use of a lagged research
design, we did not run a true experiment, which would have allowed us to
truly make causal inferences regarding the effects we found in this study.
Clearly, research such as this represents an important avenue for future work
on goals, performance, and collective efficacy beliefs in teams.
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